Soviet Shadows: The Enduring Legacy of the KGB
The negatives of institutional memory and how the KGB influenced the FSB
Institutional memory is often seen as a force for good and a way of keeping certain customs, processes, and knowledge alive within an organization whether it be a business or a government despite the changeover in personnel. But what if that memory is not a force for good?
The article discusses the Russian Intelligence services specifically what the current Russian intelligence services have inherited from previous intelligence services. This led me to look at what the current FSB (Federal Security Service) inherited from the former intelligence agency it replaced the KGB (Soviet Committee of State Security). The article will summarize a few key sources found in my research and discuss where their findings converge and diverge.
During the Cold War, few organizations were as dreaded and feared as the Soviet Committee for State Security better known as the KGB. The KGB was feared inside and outside of Russia and its history and reputation are shrouded in myth and secrecy. The KGB’s mandate over internal security, foreign intelligence, counter-espionage, and policing required tremendous resources. The agency had hundreds of thousands of employees and its network of informants counted in the millions. The KGB however, did not last forever. At least not in name.
In 1991 on December 26th the Soviet Union dissolved into separate independent republics. The new institution that replaced the KGB took on the name of the Federal Security Service (FSB). This begs the question of what happened to the KGB, its resources, its former agents and how did it shape the future of Russia?
The chaos of the 1990s in Russia is particularly difficult to navigate for historians and journalists alike. The 1990s in Russia was a time of rampant government corruption, high crime especially the organized variety, and economic instability. Many of the people involved in the 1990s have since either become integral parts of the government, been imprisoned due to falling out with the regime or died. Examples of this include Georgy Pavlov and Dmitry Lissovolik who were both very familiar with KGB money laundering operations and both jumped off their balconies in the span of two weeks (Belton 37). Figures who were central to the rise of President Vladimir Putin like Boris Yeltsin, the first President of the Russian Federation and Anatoly Sobchak, first mayor of Saint Petersburg have been dead for decades. Those with intimate knowledge of the transition between the KGB and FSB are those who are currently a part of Putin’s inner circle. Igor Sechin, Viktor Ivanov, Viktor Cherkesov, and Sergei Ivanov all worked for the KGB and then, except for Sechin, went on to work for the FSB (Belton 15). All this is to say that researching this topic is extremely difficult given the secrecy of intelligence services and the instability in Russia in the 1990s. This has resulted in different approaches to uncovering how the transition between KGB and FSB took place. These approaches can be divided into two camps: academic and journalistic. This article will explore both to show the common arguments between the two and what insight both give into the legacy of the KGB and how it shaped the modern FSB in Russia.
In Bateman’s article The KGB and its Enduring Legacy, written in 2016, he examines the history of intelligence services in Russia beginning with the Oprischnik of Ivan the Terrible to the present form of the FSB. The main argument of the book is not that the KGB survived and is now under a different name but that the FSB is simply the latest iteration of the secret police in Russia. Bateman shows how the series of Russian secret police services all built off the legacy of their predecessors. For example, the KGB itself was the successor to the NKVD which was a tool to ensure the power of the new Soviet government could not be contested internally (Bateman 2016: p. 29). This leads to Bateman's secondary argument that the Soviet Intelligence services vary greatly from their Western counterparts. Their main objective is to quell internal dissent and assure the continuing authority of the government. Bateman goes on to discuss how the FSB came to be and the meager attempts to dismantle the KGB following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The rising influence of the security services on policy and the appointment of Putin as head of the FSB in 1999 meant that any attempt to reform the Russian security services into something more democratic was hopeless. This is supported by the fact that foreign intelligence gathering was the last area to be re-absorbed by the FSB. Yeltsin also made oversight over the FSB the responsibility of the President of Russia and not the parliament (Bateman 2016: p.44). Bateman sums up his arguments by saying “First, the KGB never died; second, the Russian concept of security continues to emphasize internal stability over external security concerns; and third, the primary objective of the KGB’s successors is to ensure the current regime’s survival by at times using extrajudicial means” (Bateman 47). Bateman’s argument is based on the structure of the system and that it was inevitable for the KGB to continue in one form or another not necessarily due to any individual or group but the nature of the power structures and government in Russia.
Other academics have also taken a similar historical approach to Bateman such as Ulf Walther in his article Russia’s Failed Transformation: The Power of the KGB/FSB from Gorbachev to Putin. Whereas Bateman gives a historical account of the long history of intelligence agencies in Russia, Walther gives a much more focused historical analysis of what happened between the 1980s and 2014. Walther focuses on the government reforms in Russia that allowed the KGB to morph into the current-day FSB. The article looks at successive changes to government structures done by Brezhnev, Andropov, Gorbachev, and then the reforms in the Russian Federation done by Yeltsin and Putin. Walther paints a picture of a long process of government reforms from consolidating the power with Putin’s circle in key government roles and the tensions between the judiciary, Presidency, and the newly created security services (Walther 2014: p.673). Walther argues that the KGB is indeed the successor and heavily influenced the FSB. He goes on to say it remains distinct in its subservience to the Presidency, and lack of official oversight and that this is due to the FSB's deep penetration of the organs of policymaking in Russia (Walther 2014: p.674). This has made any reform of the security services of Russia impossible without the support of the FSB. The two pieces by Bateman and Walther fit very well together and agree that the system itself endured and efforts to reform were made impossible by the long-standing traditions of power in Russia as well as deep integration of the security services in every area of government.
Whereas Bateman and Walther provide historical comparisons between both the KGB and its predecessors and successors, journalists can provide more current and in-depth examples of the links between the KGB and the present FSB. Bateman and Walther provide a clear argument as to how the organizations are structurally similar and play the same role in government. The one question that they do not focus on is: What does that mean for the hundreds of thousands of former KGB employees and where did they all end up?
In Catherine Belton’s book Putin’s People: How the KGB took back Russia and then took on the West she provides a distinct and much more detailed account of the transition between the KGB and the FSB and the enduring links that exist. The KGB was instrumental in the takeover of the levers of power in Russia with many of its members not only surviving the breakup of the Soviet Union but thriving in the new Russian Federation. The KGB may have disappeared in name, but its culture, networks, alumnus, and methods have enabled figures like Vladimir Putin, himself a former KGB agent, to seize control of Russia's economy and enrich themselves to the detriment of the Russian people and the West. Through interviews with Kremlin insiders and careful analysis of records and documents, Belton paints a picture of how Putin’s cronies have schemed their way to the highest levels of government in Russia. The book follows the timeline of events from when Putin took up his post in Dresden, East Germany in 1985 as a foreign intelligence working closely with the Stasi, the East German equivalent of the KGB, to Putin’s current reign as autocrat of Russia. Not only is this an account of Putin’s rise to power but the figures that helped and hindered his rise to power. Belton’s account focuses on the elaborate schemes undertaken by the siloviki, the cabal of former KGB agents who behind the scenes-controlled Russia. Putin came to control this group in time but they are united by their dream of restoring Russia to its former Soviet glory. This dream also included paranoia over the West’s expansion into Russia’s sphere of influence. Events like the election of pro-western Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine and the expansion of NATO made the siloviki dream up new schemes to undermine the West. Putin’s schemes have not only made him and his allies extremely wealthy but also given him access to tremendous resources that can be used to restore the former glory of Russia or better yet undermine and destabilize the West. Through her investigative journalism, Belton is able to provide a much more grounded and detailed account of the inner workings of the KGB and those who facilitated the transition to the FSB. Although this journalistic approach is very different from Bateman and Walther the two still point to the same key events such as Boris Yeltsin’s role in enabling the rise of the FSB. This started by grooming the young ex-KGB officer Vladimir Putin for power through positions in the new Russian Federation. This included appointing him as head of the newly formed Federal Security Service (FSB). Belton discusses Yeltsin's vain attempt to dismantle the old KGB apparatus by spreading their previous mandate across multiple agencies. This meant that the former responsibilities of the KGB now fell under the mandate of the Ministry of Defense, Border Guard Service, and the newly created Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). The most important change made by Yeltsin was making the FSB answerable only to the Presidency (Belton 2020: p.79). This ensured that when Putin took over the organization could grow and be accountable only to the President.
However, Bateman, Walther, and Belton took very different approaches to discussing and researching the enduring legacy of the KGB in Russia. They found that there were structural factors that made the permanent dismantling of the KGB impossible and both argue that there is a clear succession between the KGB and FSB. Belton focuses much more on the FSB’s foreign operations whereas Bateman and Walther somewhat dismiss these as a secondary focus of the FSB. Bateman’s argument is based on how structurally the KGB was never primarily a foreign intelligence service and its foreign operations were directed toward enemies of the state abroad (Bateman 40). Belton however shows that the FSB’s operations are much more extensive than that of the KGB and especially recently have been involved in spreading misinformation in the West.
The final account is that of Soldatov and Boragan who are also journalists but unlike Belton are Russian and therefore approach the issue with more cultural knowledge of the topic. Much like Belton, their research benefited from sources within the security services but mostly relied on public information. Their book The New Nobility: The Restoration of Russia’s Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB which was published in 2010 looks at how the Russian security services have been ill-equipped to deal with terrorism in Russia, the FSB’s origins and unlike the previous sources paints the FSB as rather incompetent. The authors also highlight that the FSB must not be mistaken for a revival of the Soviet KGB. The FSB is according to Soldatov and Boragan: “a remarkably independent entity, free of party control and parliamentary oversight. If the FSB has an ideology, it is the goal of stability and order” (Soldatov and Boragan 2010: p.4). This differs from the ideology of the KGB which was to protect the Communist Party and was much more subservient to the Party than the FSB is to the Presidency in the Russian Federation. They also contrast the challenges that the FSB and KGB have had to face. Whereas the KGB played a major role in espionage and counterintelligence and faced state-level adversaries the FSB faced different enemies. Shortly after its creation, the FSB had to deal with the conflict in Chechnya and the ensuing terrorist attacks across Russia. Urban guerrilla warfare and armed insurgencies were not anything the Russian security services had experienced (Soldatov and Boragan 2010: p.155). The authors discuss the disastrous government responses to the Moscow Theatre Hostage Crisis in 2002 which ended with the death of 170 people and the tragic events of the Beslan hostage crisis which ended with the death of 334 people many of which were children. The authors argue that “The security services see themselves as the only forces capable of saving the country from internal and external enemies, the saviors of a nation sundered by the upheaval and chaos of the 1990s” and yet they remain focused on assuring their survival to the detriment of the democracy in Russia (Soldatov and Boragon 5). This book gives a contrasting perspective to the other sources that have been looked at so far and puts a greater emphasis on the failures of the FSB. However, it is important to note that the 13 years since the book was published have been very eventful for Russia. Vladimir Putin returned to the Presidency in 2012 and Russia ramped up its confrontation with the West by annexing Crimea in 2014 and launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Despite the account being dated, it does effectively show how the FSB did replace and inherit much from the KGB but plays a different role in Russia and is structurally different from its predecessor.
The resources as well as the institutional memory of the KGB proved very difficult to disperse and prevent from returning to a position of power in the new Russian Federation. Various authors have taken different approaches to study the enduring legacy of the KGB. The two main distinctions are from a journalistic and historical point of view. Bateman and Walther took a historical approach focusing on institutional precedents both in the short and long-term history of Russia. Bateman argued that Russia has always made use of internal security forces like the KGB, Stalin’s NKVD, and even the oprichnik of Ivan the Terrible. Therefore it was inevitable that the FSB came to resemble the KGB so strongly. On the other hand, Walther looked at the specific structure of the KGB and the various government reforms and laid a clear chain of institutional succession from the KGB to the FSB. This extended not only from the mandates but also to various government agencies that were formerly a part of the KGB but were soon absorbed by the FSB such as the border services and cryptographic service. The second set of authors approaches the issue from a journalistic perspective and focuses less on the institutional memory and history of intelligence services but looks at key events and figures that were pivotal in the transition from the KGB to the FSB. Authors Catherine Belton as well as Saldatov and Borogan went into much greater detail regarding the tumultuous years of the 1990s. They focused on the individuals who carried over from the KGB and used their knowledge and resources to ensure the security services retained the role at the center of power in Russia. None of the authors claim that the rise of the FSB was entirely structural or caused by individuals but the argument towards structural factors being the main is more compelling. Key figures such as Putin and his cabal were modeled by institutions like the KGB which was in turn shaped by previous institutions. They went on to shape institutions that were inspired by the KGB and attempted to improve and adapt the new FSB to the needs of the new Russian Federation. The main distinction that is highlighted by all the authors is that, unlike the KGB, the FSB seems to be in the service not of the state but the current group of elites in power in Russia.
Sources:
Bateman, Aaron. “The KGB and Its Enduring Legacy.” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 1 (2016): 23–47. https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2016.1129863.
Belton, Catherine. Putin’s People : How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West. First American edition. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020.
Gordievsky, Oleg, and Christopher Andrew . KGB: The inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev. London, UK: Hodder and Stoughton, 1990.
Michael J. Waller, Victor J. Yasmann. (1995) Russia's Great Criminal Revolution: The Role of the Security Services. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 11:4, pages 276-297.
Soldatov Andrej Alekseevič, and Irina Petrovna Borogan. The New Nobility the Restoration of Russia's Security State and the Enduring Legacy of the KGB. New York, USA: Public Affairs, 2011.
Walther, Ulf. “Russia’s Failed Transformation: The Power of the KGB/FSB from Gorbachev to Putin.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 27, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 666–86. doi:10.1080/08850607.2014.924808.
Further Reading:
Kalugin, Oleg. Spymaster: My Thirty-Two Years in Intelligence and Espionage against the West. New York, NY, USA: Basic Books, 2009.
This article was adapted from an essay written for Prof. Timothy Sayle’s class The Search for European Security since 1945 at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy.